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Feminist legal scholarship comes in many shapes and sizes. It can
include traditional legal scholarship focused on areas of concern to femi-
nists, for example, marital property, child custody, sexual harassment, and
reproductive freedom. It can include legal histories of the struggle for
women's rights and biographies of early women lawyers.' Scholarship of
these types has been with us for some time, although it has become more
plentiful with the increase in the number of female legal academics. There
is also a new brand of feminist legal scholarship.'I refer to that body of
theoretical work popularly known as feminist jurisprudence or feminist
legal thought. The question I raise in this Essay is the following: How is this
new feminist scholarship being received by the legal academy?
My working hypothesis is that, despite superficial signs of acceptance, 2
the legal academy as a whole has remained skeptical about the value of
feminist scholarship. 3 The purpose of this Essay is to explore some of the
manifestations of that skepticism and to suggest some of its causes. In Part
I, I will explain further what I mean by "feminist jurisprudence" and
provide a quick survey of some of the substantive issues currently being
debated by feminist legal theorists.4 My intent is to give readers who are
unfamiliar with feminist scholarship some feel for its richness and diversity.
*Professor of Law, University of Iowa; A.B., 1968, Vassar College; J.D., 1973, University of
Georgia. This Essay is a revised version of the speech I gave at the Voices of Women
Conference in April 1990. Additional research funds for this paper were provided by Dean
Mark Yudof of the University of Texas, to whom I am indebted. I am also indebted to the
participants at a faculty colloquium at the University of Texas School of Law for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft. I am particularly grateful to the following persons for their
written comments on an earlier draft: Joseph Dodge, Douglas Laycock, Jean Love, Judith
Resnik, and John Robertson. I am also grateful to Margaret Menicucci, J.D., 1990, University
of Texas, for excellent and timely research assistance, and to Jill Altman, University of Iowa,
for updating that research.
1. See, e.g., Barbara Babcock & Clara S. Foltz, First Woman, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 673 (1988)
(telling the story of California's first woman lawyer); see also Herma Hill Kay, The Future of
Women Law Professors, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 5 (1991) (telling the stories of the first women law
professors in this country).
2. For example, most prominent law reviews have published at least one "feminist
jurisprudence" article. See Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal Scholar-
ship: A Bibliography, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 87 (1991). In addition, the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) included "feminist jurisprudence" as an example of one of the new trends in
legal education at its annual meeting several years ago. AALS Annual Meeting, Los Angeles,
Jan. 1987.
3. Richard Delgado focuses on this skepticism in a recent article in which he analyzes the
academy's marginalization of "two groups of insurgent scholars, Critical Race Theorists and
radical feminists." See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize
Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr. 1992) (manuscript
at 5, on file with the University of Iowa College of Law Library).
4. See infra notes 6-52 and accompanying text.
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Then, in Part II, I will address the two questions that are central to this
paper: (1) Is feminist jurisprudence being taken seriously by the legal
academy? and (2) If not, why not?5
I. WHAT Is FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE?
A. Definitional Problems
It is difficult enough to define "feminism," let alone "feminist juris-
prudence." No single definition could possibly capture the richness and
diversity of feminist thought. Nonetheless, I offer the following as a starting
point: Feminist legal scholarship seeks to analyze the law's effect on women
as a class. 6 Furthermore, the analysis is formed by a distinctly feminist point
of view, a point of view that is shaped by an understanding of women's life
experiences. This understanding can come either from living life as a
woman and developing critical consciousness about that experience or from
listening carefully to the stories of female experience that come from
others. "Feminist jurisprudence," as a subcategory of feminist legal schol-
arship, refers loosely to the more theoretical writings of feminist legal
scholars.
As a general proposition, I take the position that legal scholarship is
not feminist unless it is grounded in women's experience, an experience
which produces a feminist point of view. Substantively, there can be
differences of opinion among feminists,7 differences that result from
different points of view. I do not take the position either that there is one
correct feminist viewpoint or that only women can develop a feminist
viewpoint. I focus on method rather than substance. One must listen
carefully to women's life stories to develop a feminist point of view. It may
be easier to develop a feminist point of view if you are a woman listener
because it is often easier to understand stories similar to your own. This
commonality of experience can be especially helpful to a listener when the
stories are not part of the dominant discourse.8 Nonetheless, women often
listen to stories of other women who are quite different from themselves.
We listen to each other's life experiences across race, class, and other lines.
And I believe that men can, and sometimes do, listen across gender lines.
In its broadest sense, the feminist project is about dismantling the
sex-gender system, a system that historically has privileged the male over
the female. Law is part of this system, indeed a central part. Uncovering the
ways in which law has privileged male over female is the immediate goal of
much feminist legal writing. Listening to women is an essential step in this
project.
5. See infra notes 53-85 and accompanying text.
6. Katharine Bartlett has called this method "asking the woman question." See Katharine
T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 831 (1990).
7. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. -
8. Thus, it may be that men need to work harder to hear women's stories because at least
some men's stories are familiar to all. They are part of the public discourse in that they are
more widely told by male authors, filmmakers, and scholars. Male stories are also more visible
in our history books. Some men's stories are less visible to some women. For example, the
stories of African-American or Native American men are less visible to white women.
[1991]
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To some, current feminist writing may appear to privilege the female
voice over the male. The feminist project may appear to be aimed at a
reversal of the hierarchy in the sex-gender system, a reversal that puts
women on top. This is a serious and dangerous misunderstanding. Femi-
nism aims ultimately to eliminate the hierarchy completely, to maximize
equal respect for all human beings, and to ensure that previously silenced
points of view are given equal voice.
There is much misunderstanding about feminist legal scholarship that
has affected its reception in the legal academy. The values of the legal
academy have been overly determined by a male point of view, which is not
surprising when one considers that the institution has been predominantly
male for so long. My aim in this Essay is to begin a conversation that might
help reduce the misunderstanding and create some space for a feminist
point of view in the academy.
For purposes of this Essay, I refer to two basic categories of feminist
jurisprudential scholarship: (1) "Abstract theory," and (2) "connected
scholarship." The starting point for all feminist theory is women's experi-
ence. Theory is created by moving beyond the specifics of individual
women's experiences, that is, by generalizing from those experiences. I
envision these two categories of feminist legal scholarship as occurring in
layers above the ground. At the lowest layer, next to the earth, are pure
descriptions of women's experience. As a scholar begins to build theory
from those descriptions, she will abstract (e.g., separate) selected facts from
their roots in the ground. The more generalized the theory becomes, the
more abstracted from its roots it becomes. The scholarship at the top layer,
in my categorization, is "abstract theory." Some would call this category
"grand theory."9 At a lower layer, closer to the ground, is the scholarship I
would classify as "connected scholarship." Scholarship falling into this
category, although sufficiently abstracted from facts to become theory, is
also still sufficiently connected to those facts that it reveals the experience
upon which the theory is based. 10
Some feminist legal scholars engage in both sorts of scholarship. For
example, some of Catharine MacKinnon's work is so dearly connected to
the experiential data of women's lives that the experience itself is revealed
to readers. 1I However, her more recent scholarship is less explicit about
women's experience.' 2 Thus, I would place this recent work in the "abstract
9. See Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1147 (1989)
(describing Catherine MacKinnon's work). See also Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion of
Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform 7 (1991) ("Feminist legal scholarship
... seems to be drifting toward abstract grand theory presentations.").
10. Cf Fineman, supra note 9, at 7 (describing her approach to legal theory as a "theory
of the middle range," a phrase she attributes to Robert Merton).
11. For an especially good example, see Chapter 3 in Catharine A. MacKinnon, The
Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979).
12. Compare id. at 143-213 (deriving a theory of sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination from the reported and described real life experiences of women) with Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 81-84 (1987) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminism
Unmodified] (theorizing about rape on the basis of comments she has heard from other
women, but giving no details of her sources).
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theory" category. Robin West, Christine Littleton, and Frances Olsen have
produced a significant amount of feminist legal scholarship, some of it in
the "abstract theory" category and some of it in the "connected scholarship"
category.'1 Martha Fineman and Carrie Menkel-Meadow are feminist legal
scholars who have more consistently revealed the empirical data upon
which their theories are built, placing them more solidly in the "connected
scholarship" category.14 Other forms of "connected scholarship" include
creative telling of the stories behind the theory, whether those stories are
real,15 are derived from literature, 16 or are some combination of the real
and the imagined.' 7
Both categories of feminist jurisprudential scholarship face resistance
in the predominantly male legal academy. "Connected" feminist scholar-
ship is often trivialized. Some academics argue it is too "fact oriented."
"Abstract" feminist scholarship, on the other hand, is sometimes criticized
for being "too theoretical." There exists a single difficulty that lies beneath
both of these complaints. I call this difficulty the problem of "gendered
misunderstanding." Coupled with the expectations that our male col-
leagues have of legal scholarship, "gendered misunderstanding" causes
some academics to view the facts of women's lives as unconnected to the
great jurisprudential issues of our time.' 8 "Gendered misunderstanding"
also leads to a misreading of much abstract feminist theory. Part II of this
13. Compare Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279
(1987) [hereinafter Littleton, Reconstructing] ("abstract theory" of equality) with Christine A.
Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering
of Women, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 23 [hereinafter Littleton, Women's Experience] ("connected
scholarship" telling stories of battered women); compare Frances E. Olsen, The Sex of Law, in
The Politics of Law 453 (D. Kairys ed., 1990) ("abstract theory") with Frances E. Olsen, From
False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois
1869-1895, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1518 (1986) ("connected scholarship" providing historical context
for early sex discrimination cases); compare Robin L. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1987) ("abstract theory" recognizing women's experience without retelling it)
with Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. 81 (1987) ("connected scholarship" telling
stories of women's lives).
14. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse Professional Language and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727 (1988); Martha L. Fineman,
Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change-A Study of Rhetoric and
Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 789 [hereinafter
Fineman, Implementing Equality]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 39 (1985); Fineman,
supra note 9.
15. For an especially good example, see Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989).
16. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev.
581, 597 (1990).
17. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity and the
Cycle of Exclusion, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1625 (1990).
18. For example, although Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), has been central to Supreme
Courtjurisprudence in recent years, the academy's attention has been captured by the abstract
question of 'Judicial review," rather than the way in which the substance of abortion decisions
plays itself out in the actual lives of real women.
[1991]
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Essay addresses the problem of "gendered misunderstanding."' 9
B. The Substance of Feminist Jurisprudence
1. The Sameness-Difference Question
The term "feminist jurisprudence" arose in articles questioning
whether the equality theory required that women be treated the same as
men, or whether the equality theory should ever recognize women's
differences from men.20 Much feminist legal scholarship of the 1980s
focused on this question of "sameness versus difference." Liberal
feminists2' argued that it is better to stress the similarities of men and
women and to minimize the differences.2 2 By contrast, radical feminists
argued against the assimilation that "sameness" arguments tended to
produce and called for equality theories that recognized gender
differences.2 3 Catharine MacKinnon argued that we ought to abandon the
rhetoric of equality altogether, because it invariably compared women to
men, using men as the norm. 24 In her view, the important difference
between women and men is the difference in power. Using the rhetoric of
dominance, radical feminists in the MacKinnon camp advocate the replace-
ment of equality with the antisubordination theory, which is aimed at
ending the difference in power.25
Although the "sameness-difference" debate continues,26 it is no longer
the central issue in feministjurisprudence. Most feminists in law agree legal
constructs have been created by patriarchal forces that have excluded
19. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
20. See Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 Yale L.J. 1373 (1986)
(shifting ground from her earlier work and aligning herself with Catharine MacKinnon's
critique of legal doctrine, including equality theory, as male constructed); Ann Scales, Towards
a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L.J. 375 (1981) (arguing that equality theory ought to
recognize that women are different from men with respect to pregnancy); see also Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 723-34 (1982) (discussing
equality theory in the context of a book review of Ann Jones, Women Who Kill (1980)).
21: The theory of liberal feminists is rooted in the belief that women, as well as men, are
rational, rights-bearing, autonomous human beings. Liberal feminist theories tend to empha-
size individuals and their rights. By contrast, radical feminists focus on women as a class. For
a more complete discussion of the various schools of feminist thought, see Patricia A. Cain,
Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 803 (1990).
22. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/
Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325 (1984-85) [hereinafter
Williams, Equality's Riddle]; Wendy W. Williams, Notes From A First Generation, 1989 U.
Ghi. Legal F. 99.
23. See, e.g., Littleton, Reconstructing, supra note 13, at 1279; Littleton, Women's
Experience, supra note 13, at 23.
24. "A built-in tension exists between this concept of equality, which presupposes
sameness, and this concept of sex, which presupposes difference. Sex equality thus becomes a
contradiction in terms, something of an oxymoron, which may suggest why we are having such
a difficult time getting it." MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 12, at 33.
25. See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003 (1986).
26. For an excellent interdisciplinary collection of essays on this issue, see Theoretical
Perspectives on Sexual Difference (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990).
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women. Thus, use of the equality theory, which has been constructed by
"masculine jurisprudence," (i.e., "sameness" arguments) necessarily rein-
forces patriarchal values. And yet feminist litigators also understand that if
they reject "sameness" arguments in favor of "difference" arguments in a
court system still embedded in patriarchy, they run the risk of losing their
client's cases. What to argue ("sameness" or "difference") and when to
argue it has become primarily a question of strategy. 27
2. Feminist Method
More recent debates in feminist legal scholarship focus on questions of
method. The remainder of Part II sketches a brief overview of the feminist
understanding of method. It also examines two questions arising in
connection with method: The question of authentic voice and the question
of essentialism.
Consciousness-raising often is cited as the original feminist method, or
at least the most genuine feminist method. In her recent article, Feminist
Legal Methods,28 Katharine Bartlett discusses the role of consciousness-
raising in building legal theory and proposes other views of feminist
method that might be used in the law.29 Consciousness-raising, as feminist
method, is central to much of Catharine MacKinnon's work,30 and its value
as method has been discussed by many feminist legal scholars.3 '
Consciousness-raising is a practice associated with certain feminist
groups of the 1970s. These were small groups of women sometimes
consisting of friends, but sometimes of strangers, and often including
women from diverse backgrounds.8 2 These groups met regularly to discuss
topics related to their personal lives as women. There are two main values
associated with these consciousness-raising groups: (1) They helped to
identify previously hidden truths about women's experience, and (2) the
process itself was empowering for the individual participants.
The feminist practice of consciousness-raising of the 1970s meant
listening to other women's stories and finding the commonalities. From
27. See Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 115, 134-35 [herein-
after Minow, Beyond Universality]; see also Cain, supra note 21, at 803.
28. See Bartlett, supra note 6.
29. Other methods include asking the woman question and practical reasoning. See
Bartlett, supra note 6, at 831.
30. For MacKinnon's most extensive discussion of consciousness-raising as feminist
method, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 83-105 (1989)
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory].
31. See, e.g, Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method
Makes, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (1989) (reviewing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmod-
ified (1987)); see also Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
Berkeley Women's L.J. 191, 195-97 (1989-90).
32. Early consciousness-raising groups were an outgrowth of "rap sessions" held by radical
women who had participated in leftist organizations of the 1960s. Consciousness-raising, as
feminist method, appears to have originated with a group known as the New York Radical
Women, who presented a paper explaining and defending the practice at the 1968 National
Women's Liberation Conference. See Anita Shreve, Women Together, Women Alone 10
(1989).
[1991]
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these common stories, feminists gained new insights about the role of
gender in women's lives. As a legal method, consciousness-raising has come
to stand for any form of research or legal argument that begins with
women's experience. A difficulty arises, however, in defining women's
experience. More specifically, if consciousness-raising is about listening to
the experiences of women in order to discover new truths and build new
theories, then to which women do we listen?
Some feminists believe conscio-usness-raising possesses inherent limi-
tations to its usefulness. The limitations stem from the fact that
consciousness-raising relies on the ability of individual women to identify
their commonalities. Consciousness-raising groups may have had their
strongest impact on women who were sufficiently similar in class and ethnic
background and who could recognize their lives in the lives of other group
members.
If this view of consciousness-raising is correct, is it sufficient for
theorists to rely on truths about women's experience learned in
consciousness-raising groups of the 1970s? Or, now that we are more aware
of the class and race bias that permeated the women's movement of the
1970s, must we dig deeper for stories of women's experience that may not
have been uncovered yet? If we are to dig deeper, what sort of research
agenda might that entail for feminists in law?
There is a related question about listening to women and building
feminist theory. Because feminist scholarship focuses on the effect of
gender in our society, we ought to listen to the women who can tell us the
most about gender. But who are they? For example, will we learn more
about the problem of gender if we listen to the common experiences of
white, middle-class, heterosexual women-the rationale for such a focus
being that such women suffer only one oppression, sexism? Or, will we
learn more by listening to women of color, poor women, and lesbians
because they are more oppressed? Does the voice of the most oppressed
count more when one is trying to build theories to end oppression?33
3. Authentic Voice
The preceding discussion of feminist method raises another problem
which I identify as "the problem of authentic voice." The question here is,
after we have listened to women, whom do we believe? Who speaks the
truth? For example, some women describe their sexual experiences as
episodes of sexual subordination, while other women describe the same
sorts of experiences as erotic. Who is speaking the truth?
This problem is reflected in an exchange that took place between
Carol Gilligan34 and Catharine MacKinnon some years ago at the Buffalo
33. See Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center 15 (1984); MariJ. Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. G.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
323, 324-26 (1987) [hereinafter Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom].
34. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Devel-
opment 18-19 (1982). This book challenges earlier research by Kohlberg on the moral
development of children. Gilligan's work suggests that Kohlberg's research shows a male bias,
that his categories of development are male constructed, and that women often speak "in a
different voice" Kohlberg does not hear. Gilligan's work spurred a wide range of feminist
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Law School.3 5 Gilligan said that women speak in a different voice, a voice
embracing such values as care and connection to other human beings. She
took the position that this different voice ought to be valued. MacKinnon
responded by observing that women do not speak in their own voices. Their
speech is affected by the fact that men have all-the power-or as MacKin-
non put it-"his foot is on her throat!"36
These two perspectives appear to set up a dilemma. We are to listen to
women, but, if we believe MacKinnon, what women say is only what men
make them say. We should not build moral truths from this different
voice.37 Some call this the problem of false consciousness and argue that
consciousness-raising serves to combat false consciousness and helps to
develop critical consciousness. 38 According to this view, those of us who
have developed critical consciousness will know which women speak the
truth because we possess the special insight that comes from recognizing
our own oppression. By contrast, some feminists are unwilling to claim that
any women are deluded and thus argue all perspectives held by females are
equally true.3 9
Yet other feminists, including MacKinnon,40 refuse to claim either
critiques in various academic disciplines, including law, which challenged the dominant "male
voice." For legal theorists influenced by Gilligan's, early work, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley,
Women's L.J. 39 (1985) and West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 13.
35. Ellen C. Dubois et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversa-
tion, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 11, 74-75 (1985).
36. Id. at 74. MacKinnon's image of his foot on her throat may well be inspired by the
words of the nineteenth century feminist, Sarah Grimke: "I ask no favors for my sex .... All
I ask our brethren is, that they will take their feet from off our necks, and permit us to stand
upright .. " Gerda Lerner, The Grimke Sisters from South Carolina 192 (1967) (quoting
Sarah Grimke, Letters on Equality 10 (date unavailable)).
37. For example, MacKinnon writes that
[b]y establishing that women reason differently from men on moral questions,
[Gilligan] revalues that which has accurately distinguished women from men by
making it seem as though women's moral reasoning is somehow women's, rather than
what male supremacy has attributed to women for its own use.... Women may have
an approach to moral reasoning, but it is an approach made both of what is and of
what is not allowed to be.
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory, supra note 30, at 51 (emphasis added).
38. See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 33, at 359-62, nn.147-57.
39. See Lorraine Code, Experience Knowledge, and Responsibility, in Women, Knowl-
edge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy 157, 169 (Ann Garry & Marilyn
Pearsall eds., 1989) (discussing use of stories in building knowledge but noting that stories "are
not necessarily truer" than stereotypes in the empirical objective sense of the word true); Lynn
Hankinson Nelson, Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism 25-28 (1990)
(discussing different theories of truth). I agree with Nelson that there is no point in making
truth claims about individual experiences. Instead, one must explain how particular experi-
ence contributes to our normative theories. Kathryn Abrams makes a similar point when she
argues in favor of feminist narrative scholarship that "stress[es] the elaboration of the
normative content of narratives." Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L. Rev.
971, 1045 (1991).
40. Because MacKinnon's theory is similar to Marxism in several respects, she has
sometimes been associated with the "false consciousness" explanation that some women
[1991]
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horn of the dilemma. They argue that to ask "who speaks the truth?" is
inappropriate. To ask the question is to adopt a patriarchal view of truth as
something that is objectively verifiable. The point of feminist critique is to
question all basic premises of the patriarchy, including its objectivist
epistemology. Nor should feminism collapse into ethical relativism, for that
too assumes there is a contrary position, ethical objectivism. While it is true,
in a sense, that each woman speaks her own truth, feminism is not totally
subjective. All women's experience occurs within a system of male domi-
nance and thus tells us something about that system. The point of feminist
method is to "uncover and claim as valid"41 all female experience-
experience which has been devalued by the sex-gender system.
This latter position is difficult to explain in a world which values
objectivity and a coherent rule of law, as does the legal academy. Yet,
feminist practice, by rejecting objectivity and by paying attention to context
and multiple perspectives, can uncover the partiality and subjectivity of
supposedly objective legal truths. There should be room for feminist
practice of this sort within the legal academy, for, as Martha Minow has
claimed, "[T]here is . . . more than one context relevant to evaluating
fairness. This, of course, is a basic insight informing the adversary system,
and democracy itself."'42
The debate over epistemology continues within the feminist commu-
nity. Some feminists worry that a complete rejection of objectivity will
undercut the strength of feminist claims about what is morally right. To
resolve this debate, feminists would have to agree upon a common
epistemological theory,43 an event unlikely to occur any time in the near
future.44
4. Essentialism45
Essentialism can have a number of different meanings, and feminists
are not always clear about which meaning they are attacking or, less
frequently, adopting. In ancient realist philosophies "essentialism" means
misperceive their own reality. See generally Olsen, supra note 9, at 1168 (comparing MacKin-
non's theory to Marxism and noting that "[w]orkers and wives may suffer from 'false
consciousness' if they misperceive their true interests."). MacKinnon, however, explicitly
rejects this "false consciousness." MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory, supra note 30, at
115-16.
41. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory, supra note 30, at 116.
42. Minow, Beyond Universality, supra note 27, at 137.
43. See Bartlett, supra note 6, at 829 (discussing various epistemological theories in
feminist legal methods); see also Barbara Flagg, Women's Narratives, Women's Story, 59 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 147 (1990) (reviewing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the
State (1989)); MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory, supra note 30.
44. See Marsha P. Hanen, Feminism, Objectivity, and Legal Truth, in Feminist Perspec-
tives 29, 44 (Lorraine Code et al. eds., 1988) (concluding it is too early to develop new "more
humane and co-operative forms of knowledge" because we are still too busy deconstructing the
objective truths of the past). But see Nelson, supra note 39, at 37-42 (arguing against
"standpoint theories" of knowledge in favor of a cbncept of knowledge derived from multiple
experiences and verified by communities).
45. Judith Resnik also raises the issue of essentialism in this symposium. See Judith Resnik,
Visible on "Women's Issues," 77 Iowa L. Rev. 41, 48 (1991).
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that all things have an existence independent of human thought and have
a true inner essence.46 The question for feminists is whether all women
share some natural essence of womanhood, an essence that is independent
of experience.4 7 Is there such a thing as the essentially female? When we
engage in the feminist method of consciousness-raising, are we searching
for knowledge about the essential nature of women? And if "woman" does
have a true inner essence, what does the discovery of this essence mean for
individual women? What does it mean for legal theories about woman's role
in society?
Many feminists reject the idea that women do in fact share something
called "woman's nature." These feminists subscribe to the social construc-
tion theory that "woman" as a category is created by society. There is no
hidden inner nature to be discovered beneath the social construction.
Rather, there is only the possibility of a different construction, the
possibility of creating a new definition. Some feminists who subscribe fully
to the social construction theory question whether there can be a unitary
category "woman" which accurately describes all women. Focusing on the
importance of experience in constructing the category, these feminists ask
whether there is an essential woman's experience. Angela Harris points out
how the search for a unitary concept "woman" has tended to privilege white
women's experience over black women's experience.48 I have argued
elsewhere that theories built on the notion of a female experience have
been resoundingly silent about lesbian experience.49 Thus, for social
constructionists, the attack on essentialism is really an attack on false
universals.50
Drucilla Cornell has attempted to rescue the concept of the essentially
feminine from charges of biological determinism or naturalism, as well as
from the claim that the concept results in false universalization. 51 Cornell's
feminist project seeks to construct a better image of the feminine, one that
transcends nature and includes possibilities for all women. She calls her
project "ethical feminism" and distinguishes it from the feminism of Robin
West and Catharine MacKinnon.
46. In Plato's notion of forms, for example, the circle's essence is its "sphere-ness." See 3
Dialogues of Plato, Theaetetus 287 (B. Jowett trans., 1953); 2 Dialogues of Plato, Republic
369, (B.Jowett trans., 1953); 1 Dialogues of Plato, Phaedo 449,459-60 (B.Jowett trans., 1937).
47. See, e.g., Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F.
59, 88-96 (suggesting certain inner essenees of woman are destroyed by patriarchy).
48. Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581
(1990).
49, See Cain, supra note 31, at 191.
50. See Minow, Beyond Universality, supra note 27, at 130-31 (arguing that for feminism
to take all women seriously, it should respect "women's own conceptions of themselves and
their interests" rather than forcing them to share an agreed upon category called "woman").
51. See Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75
Cornell L. Rev. 644 (1990); see also Susan Williams, Feminism's Search for the Feminine:
Essentialism, Utopianism, and Community, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 700 (1990) (replying to
Professor Cornell and comparing Cornell's project to communitarian political theorists such as
Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein).
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The debate over essentialism has accomplished some consciousness-
raising about the differences among us as women. I think that is good.
Some theorists fear, however, that by focusing on differences among us, the
debate will divide us politically and obscure the real gender issues that all
women face. 52
C. Sumrary
Feminist method, authentic voice, and essentialism are only some of
the interesting substantive issues currently being debated among feminist
legal scholars. As with feminist scholarship on equality, the current debates
among feminist legal scholars reflect a diversity of substantive viewpoints.
No one familiar with this literature could claim that all feminists believe
women are naturally caring and men are not, or that all feminists reject the
notion of verifiable truth. Yet these are two of the most common criticisms
about feminist scholarship. Cursory readings of scattered selections of
feminist scholarship are likely to result in serious misunderstandings about
what is a very rich and diverse body of work.
II. How Is FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE PERCEIVED BY THE LEGAL ACADEMY?
A. Is Feminist Jurisprudence Taken Seriously?
At the beginning of this Essay, I divided feminist jurisprudential
scholarship into two categories: (1) "Abstract theory," and (2) "connected
scholarship."-55 Although different institutional barriers to the production
of each category exist, there is no meaningful difference in the degree of
institutional acceptance enjoyed by either category. As a general rule,
institutional responses are greatly influenced by those in power. Thus, male
law professors largely determine the institutional response to feminist
scholarship. I would characterize the institutional response, law review
editors aside, as ranging from silent dismissal to polite questions revealing
a significant lack of understanding. 54 There are individual men at individ-
ual institutions who are neither silent nor dismissive, but they are rare. For
example, Cass Sunstein has cited feminist legal scholarship extensively and
has written a positive review of Catharine MacKinnon's book, Feminism
Unmodified.55 Carl Tobias has relied heavily on feminist writings in his
52. See Karen Offen, Feminism and Sexual Difference in Historical Perspective, in
Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Differences 13 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990); Martha L.
Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholar-
ship, 42 U. Fla. L. Rev. 25, 40 (1990).
53. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
54. My characterization is not unique. Martha Minow has similarly observed a lack of
attention to feminist legal scholarship by nonfeminist scholars and has suggested that the
silence conveys a critique of its own. Minow, Beyond Universality, supra note 27, at 117.
"Inattention itself does communicate a message of relative disinterest or complacent disre-
gard." Id. See also Delgado, supra note 3 (listing a number of ways in which feminist
scholarship is treated dismissively, e.g., including it in a string cite rather than coming to grips
with its content).
55. Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 826 (1988).
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recent scholarship.56 Judge Richard Posner also has been willing to engage
in serious academic debate with feminist scholars. 57
Although I have no hard data to support my claim that feminist
scholarship is not being taken seriously in the legal academy, I rely on more
than mere intuition in making this claim. My conclusion stems from both
my personal observations and anecdotal evidence from feminists at other
institutions. For example, we have all heard stories of feminist scholars who
have had tenure problems. Whether the cause of those problems was the
feminism in their scholarship or something else is a question that, given the
nature of tenure decisions, cannot be answered on the basis of hard data.
The stories we hear about these cases nonetheless support my claim that
much feminist scholarship is misunderstood.
A close look at who is citing whom for which principles would tell us
a great deal about how feminist scholarship is being received in the legal
academy. Indeed, there is some support for the proposition that feminist
scholarship is not being taken seriously. A simple search through the
Westlaw database for texts and periodicals 58 reveals results consistent with
my impression that, for the most part, feminist scholars are citing each
other.5 9
56. See Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 359 (1989);
Carl Tobias, Respect for Diversity: The Case of Feminist Legal Thought, 58 U. Gin. L. Rev.
175 (1989). Other male legal scholars have been influenced by feminist scholarship. See Cass
Sunstein, Feminism and Political Theory (1990); Richard Chused, Gendered Space, 42 Fla. L.
Rev. 125 (1990); Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 Duke L.J. 447; Frank Michel-
man, Private Personal But Not Split: Radin Versus Rorty, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1783 (1990). But
see David L. Kirp et a., Gender Justice (1986) (criticizing leftist feminists and supporting
policies that reflect the values of classical liberalism).
57. Judge Posner and Robin West had an exchange of viewpoints regarding liberal theory
and Kafka in the Harvard Law Review several years ago. See Richard Posner, The Ethical
Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1431 (1986). More
recently, Judge Posner participated in a feminist symposium at the University of Chicago Law
School. See Richard Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 191 (taking a
libertarian, free-market approach to sex discrimination issues and questioning the wisdom of
legal policies purporting to favor women); see also Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1311 (1989).
One can take feminist jurisprudence seriously without agreeing with its premises or
conclusions. The fact thatJudge Posner virtually stands alone in his critique of recent feminist
jurisprudential writings illustrates that the scholarship is not taken seriously enough.
58. Admittedly, the searches were cursory as I did not intend to use the results as a basis
for strong conclusions. I used the texts and periodicals database in Westlaw during the month
of October 1990. I ran one search to determine how often female-authored feminist articles
were being cited by men and by women. I omitted cites by students (when I could tell the
authors were students) and subsequent cites by the author to herself. I counted jointly
authored pieces as male-authored only if all authors were male and I did not count any authors
whose gender was not obvious to me. I did a second search to determine how often
male-authored feminist works were being cited by men and by women. I did a third search
focusing on articles about topics of interest to feminists (e.g., abortion) in order to compare the
number of male authors who cited other male authors, but did not cite key female authors.
59. See, e.g., Fineman, Implementing Equality, supra note 14, at 789 (23% of 26 cites are
by men); Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Difference, and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale
LJ. 913 (1983) (33% of 25 cites are by men); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955 (1984) (27% of 62 cites are by men); Littleton, Reconstructing, supra
note 13, at 1279 (23% of 21 cites are by men); MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note
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In a sense, this is neither surprising nor unwarranted. Tax scholars cite
each other because they share the same subject matter.60 Leftist scholars
cite each other because they share an ideology. Yet, while it is true that
common interests and ideology may explain why feminists cite each other,
I do not think it adequately explains why others do not. Many feminist
issues involve key constitutional and jurisprudential questions. Most teach-
ers and scholars of constitutional law and jurisprudence are male.61 Given
the breadth of some of the feminist articles I included in my search, it would
have been appropriate for them to have been cited by a wide range of
constitutional law and jurisprudential scholars. 62 Yet none of them were
12 (41% of 74 cites are by men); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Justice Engendered]
(42% of 77 cites are by men); Wendy W. Williams,*The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on
Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175 (1982) (24% of 33 cites are by
men).
60. The implied comparison between tax and feminism is not perfect. Feminism is not
really a subject matter area. Feminists write about subject matter areas that raise gender issues.
Most gender issues affect men as well as women, yet my impression is that more women write
about sex equality and sex discrimination than do men. I consider this further evidence that
feminist concerns are not being taken sufficiently seriously. A Westlaw search asking for "sex
discrimination," "Reed v. Reed" and "Craig v. Boren" turned up 49 articles, only 21 of which
were male-authored.
61. Indeed, during most of the years that coincide with my Westlaw search years, over 80%
of all law professors were male. See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of
Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 537 (1988)
[hereinafter Chused, Hiring and Retention]. See generally The AALS Directory of Law
Teachers 1989-90, 927-35.
62. Martha Minow's Foreword, for example, is an article that should have been more
widely cited by male scholars. See Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 59. There is no way
to determine the "correct" number of male cites. Forty-two percent of the cites to Minow in my
sample were by males. That may look low, given the gender breakdown of constitutional law
scholars. But in absolute numbers, her article was cited 32 times by men. Maybe that's the
"correct" number (i.e., evidence of sufficient seriousness). Maybe the seemingly low percent-
age (42%) results from the fact that she frequently is being cited by female scholars who are
not writing about constitutional law, but about feminism. I did compare Minow's absolute
number of male citers to the absolute number of male citers for Frank Michelman's Foreword,
published in the Harvard Law Review a year earlier. Beginning from a period roughly 6 months
after the Minow article was published, Michelman caught the attention of 49 male authors,
whereas Minow caught the attention of only 24.
I also ran a similar comparison between John Hart Ely's abortion article, The Wages of
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973) and Sylvia Law's article,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, supra note 59. During the same period of time, Ely was
cited by 80 men while Law was cited by 18. Also, I should point out that only 17 female
scholars cited to Ely during that time period and 45 females cited to Law. Given the number
of women writing about reproductive freedom, I was surprised by the small number of female
citers to Ely. On the other hand, 17 females out of 97 (17.5%) is roughly equivalent to the
gender breakdown among law professors generally. See Chused, Hiring and Retention, supra
note 61, at 537 (using 1986 statistics and showing 16% of tenured or tenure-track law faculty
were women).
Because most of the feminist articles I ran through Westlaw focused on issues of equality, I
chose to gather data on a male-authored "equality" article as well. The male-authored article
on equality that is cited most often is Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 537 (1982). Westen's article is cited by 12 women and 58 men. As with the Ely article, the
small number of women surprised me at first. However, 12 out of 70 (17%) is representative
of the gender breakdown of law professors. See Chused, Hiring and Retention, supra note 61
at 537. In contrast to the small number of women who cite Westen, 17 women and 15 men cite
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cited by more men than women. 63 Furthermore, I was shocked at how few
men have cited some of the articles that I consider among the best feminist
scholarship.64
When feminist scholarship is not ignored, it is often trivialized. I base
this claim on anecdotal evidence from others, which is confirmed by my
own personal experience. Despite the fact that major law reviews are now
quite open to publishing articles that are self-described as feminist, and
despite the fact that many law schools now offer courses in feminist
jurisprudence or feminist legal theory, I hear a surprising number of
trivializing comments about feminist scholarship. What troubles me is that
many of these comments come from persons one would expect to be
sympathetic. Here is an example:
A colleague reads an article and says: "I know this is called
feminist method-or feminist theory-but what makes it particu-
larly feminist? Why is it not just like other radical theory?"
I call this the "so what makes it feminist?" question. My early response
to such questions was a genuine attempt to explain what I thought
feminism was (a struggle to end sexist oppression) and how the particular
article or book being questioned fits into my definition of feminism (e.g., a
focus on the effect of gender in a particular setting and an explanation of
how that effect contributes to sexist oppression). I now think, however, that
many of these questions are not asked to elicit genuine information. These
questions often carry with them the following charges:
"But the realists said this fifty years ago ... 
"This is nothing more than warmed-over Marxism . . .
"This sounds just like pragmatism ...."
Such charges claim feminism offers nothing original. I hear that
allegation from women as well as men, from the left as well as the right, and
I hear it beyond my own institution. I never hear anyone say, "Hey, this
feminist legal theory is important. It asks some of the same questions raised
by legal realists fifty years ago; it borrows from well-recognized legal and
social theorists." Instead, I hear feminist legal theory being relegated to the
"nothing new" category. It is trivialized.6 5
to Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 581 (1977).
63. I am not making a claim that men do not cite women generally. My claim is that
feminist scholarship is more often cited by women than men. Because the legal academy is
predominantly male, my data suggests that the legal academy generally is not sufficiently
familiar with this scholarship.
64, See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118 (1986) (cited by only 7 men
compared with 22 women); Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 22, at 325 (cited by only 3
men compared with 29 women).
65. Martha Minow adds the following examples: (1) If feminist pedagogy is about making
the classroom more humane, then how does it differ from humanistic, clinical, and critical
legal studies? and (2) If feminism is about establishing women's legal rights then is it not just
like any other civil rights efforts? See Minow, Beyond Universality, supra note 27, at 129. See
also Delgado, supra note 3 at 39 (including in his list of mechanisms for marginalizing feminist
and critical race scholarship, a mechanism entitled "Assimilation/co-optation-We have been
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B. Why Is Feminist Jurisprudence Not Taken Seriously?
1. The Common Excuses
Some of the most common excuses for ignoring or trivializing feminist
legal scholarship are:
(1) Reader lacks time: "It is difficult enough to keep up with
scholarship in my own field of interest. There simply is not enough time to
expand my reading and become expert in other fields."
(2) -Scholarship is inaccessible: "Feminist writing is too theoretical. It
adopts the vocabulary of critical theorists who cite dead Europeans whose
work I also cannot understand."
(3) Scholarship is ideological: "Feminist writing seeks to further
women's political position. It is self-interested. As such, it is not true
scholarship."
(4) Scholarship is irrelevant to law: "Feminist writing is too abstract
and sometimes too personal. It tells me nothing about how courts should
decide cases."
(5) Scholarship insults men: "This scholarship has a counterproduc-
tive us-them tone. How do you expect me to react when I am characterized
as part of the problem?"
Some of these charges are true with respect to some feminist scholarship.
Some are also true with respect to some nonfeminist scholarship. But not all
charges are true as to all feminist scholarship.
In addition to these specific explanations for not taking feminist
scholarship seriously, there is a more general explanation. This explanation
is the "gendered misunderstanding" that, at the beginning of this Essay, I
suggested might be at the core of the legal academy's negative reaction to
feminist scholarship. Gendered misunderstanding occurs because men and
women have different life experiences. Thus, they sometimes fail to
understand conclusions drawn by the opposite sex that are based on those
different life experiences. The potential for misunderstanding is greater in
the case of conclusions based on women's experience because much of
women's experience has been buried from male view.66 Part of the feminist
project is to uncover these buried experiences.
The risk of gendered misunderstanding is high, especially as to the
most abstract and theoretical feminist scholarship, scholarship which in its
rush to theory may not fully reveal the female reality upon which it is based.
Such scholarship may be difficult to understand due to its highly abstract
nature. In some cases, the difficulty may be compounded by the author's
reliance on critical theory and its specialized language. Much male-
authored scholarship is difficult to understand for some of these same
reasons. Feminist theoretical scholarship, however, runs the further risk of
being misunderstood because it expresses a gendered view of reality.
saying this all along").
66. One might take the position that male reality similarly is hidden from female view, but
the claim loses strength if one believes that our knowledge of the world has been constructed
in accordance with male reality.
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My thesis is that the negative institutional response to feminist
jurisprudence can be explained in part by the fact that the legal academy
primarily is male and male readers have difficulty understanding theory
that has been borne of women's experience. Of course the burden for clear
communication normally falls on the author, and I do not mean to shift it
unduly to the reader. But if the misunderstanding is a gendered misun-
derstanding, then the reader's obligation to listen empathetically is as
crucial as is the author's obligation to communicate across gender lines.
I am willing to venture that some gendered misunderstanding arises
because feminist scholars fail to explain fully the grounding of their
theories. In turn, I believe that their failure to do so is attributable in large
part to institutional expectations about legal scholarship, expectations that
are at odds with my view of feminist method.67 I propose no solution to the
problem of gendered misunderstanding, but I recommend beginning a
serious dialogue about the problem. To begin the dialogue, I will offer
some observations about the institutional constraints that affect one's ability
to engage in properly grounded feminist scholarship. I then will conclude
with an expanded discussion of my claim that feminist scholarship is subject
to gendered misunderstanding.
2. Institutional Constraints
The first institutional constraint is the problem of time and the tenure
clock. If feminist method includes listening to women, then before we
theorize, we need to listen. Although this listening process may be analo-
gized to empirical research methods, it is different from other empirical
work in important ways. Feminist method is more interactive than merely
collecting data. It is a process intended to uncover experiential data about
which women have long been silent. This type of research requires time. 68
To be a full-time law professor, to teach, to do committee work, to have any
sort of personal life, and to engage in the extensive collection of experien-
tial data requires time. Increased institutional pressure to write more
articles encourages us to write on topics we can look up in books. If we rely
on other's research and theorize a little on our own, we can spin out
multiple articles. The point of feminist method, however, is to uncover new
stories and to build theory on previously silenced experiences. If tenure and
67. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Controversial Scholarship and Faculty Appointments:
A Dean's View, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 73 (1991). For example, abstract theory is often valued in the
legal academy and empirical work is frowned upon in the same way that facts are deemed
inferior to law. See Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The
Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 U. Fla. L. Rev. 25, 29-30 (1990).
In addition, most legal scholarship is written in the third person objective voice, which
assumes a common experience and point of view of the writer and reader. If I were to write
objectively assuming that all men shared my world view, I might well be misunderstood by
many male readers. However, if I were allowed to explain my personal world view before I
began my analysis of an issue, I should be able to move more readers onto my "wave length."
68. Law and society scholars who rely on original data in their scholarship also share this
problem.
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merit increases are too strongly keyed to quantity, I believe "good" feminist
legal scholarship-scholarship grounded in women's experience-will suf-
fer.
A second constraint is the absence of feminist community within many
law schools and universities. Feminist method requires collaboration. I have
been fortunate for the past seven years to share my life with another
full-time law professor who is also female and feminist. I was also fortunate
to teach at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles for two
years, where I was part of a group of feminist law teachers and scholars who
met regularly. Many feminist law professors, however, must rely on
telephones and airplanes to create a feminist community.
The problem is more than one of isolation.6 9 Once feminist scholars
have created or discovered a feminist community which allows them to
collaborate, they may find themselves faced with the dilemma that legal
scholarship is judged on an individual merit system at most institutions.
Co-authored articles often are not counted at all toward tenure and
promotion. Individually authored articles reflecting "too much collabora-
tion" sometimes are viewed as suspect. 70 Common reactions include the
following: "How do we know which part of this Article is her own original
thought?", "It's a creative piece, but she got the idea from someone else.",
and, "She's only responding to what other feminists have said. She has not
set her own agenda for research." Although I now see less of the latter type
of reaction, reduced credit for explicitly co-authored articles remains a
problem. 71
3. Gendered Misunderstanding of Feminist Scholarship
I wish to expand on my earlier observations regarding the problem of
69. Many scholars live a life of isolation with respect to their academic specialties. It is,
after all, quite natural for a university to have one specialist in each field. To be the only
professor of tax would be one form of isolation, but to be the only feminist on a law faculty is
more of a strain, especially if your scholarship questions many of the basic assumptions of your
colleagues. Fortunately, I am not the only feminist on the Iowa Law faculty. I should note,
however, that during my 17 years on the Texas Law faculty, the number of tax professors far
exceeded the number of feminists.
70. For example, I have heard questions raised about Catharine MacKinnon's work on
pornography, asking how much should be attributed to MacKinnon and how much to Andrea
Dworkin.
71. Very few feminist jurisprudence articles are co-authored, which reflects the dominant
academic standard. For examples of dynamic co-authorship by feminists, see Judith 0. Brown
et al., The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 Bluff. L.
Rev. 573 (1987); Patricia A. Cain &Jean C. Love, Stories of Rights: Developing Moral Theory
and Teaching Law, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1365 (1988) (reviewing Judith J. Thomson, Rights,
Restitution & Risk: Essays in Moral Theory (1986)); Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber,
Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 814 (1990); Delores A.
Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on
Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 435 (1981); Martha L. Fineman & Anne
Opie,The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at
Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 107; Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some
Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 9; Carolyn
Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism, 99 Yale L.J. 1913
(1990); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 1597 (1990).
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gendered misunderstanding because I believe it is one of the most serious
problems for feminist scholarship at this point in time. Although the
phenomenon affects the institutional acceptance of all feminist scholarship,
I believe it is most apparent in the case of "abstract" feminist legal theory.
Now that top law journals publish feminist scholarship, it may be more
widely read (even if it is not widely cited). However, is it being read with a
similar understanding by men and women? Robin West and others have
written of the fact that women and men have different life experiences. 72
For example, women are victims of male sexual violence. Women go
through life fearing that violence. Men, other than the perpetrators, rarely
are present when such violence occurs. Men may not understand our fear
of sexual violence. When we write about things from our "women's
experience" point of view, what can we do about the fact that our audience
includes many persons who do not share our experience?
Let me tell a story to demonstrate my point. Sandy Levinson wrote an
essay on the Second Amendment right to bear arms that was published in
a recent issue of the Yale Law Journal.73 This Essay, titled The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, like most of Levinson's writing, focuses on interesting
interpretation questions. Levinson attempts to rescue the Amendment
from its current political association with the National Rifle Association
(NRA) by arguing for a republican interpretation valuing the right of civic
resistance to state power. I need not explain his thesis as part of my story.
It is an interesting Article, as I find all of Levinson's articles to be, and I
commend it to you.
My story begins with Wendy Brown's reply to Levinson's article,
published in the same issue of the Yale Law Journal.74 Brown's main point
is that Levinson's interpretation is a gendered one; that the republican
subject, if he exists, is clearly a HE.
At the end of her article, Brown tells us an anecdote. She just tells
it-she does not connect it with the rest of her article. The reader must
make the connection, leaving a lot of room for interpretation. Here is the
anecdote: At the end of a week-long trek in the Sierra Nevada mountains,
Wendy Brown and her friends discovered their car's battery had died. After
a short panic, they found a young man in a Winnebago awaiting the first
day of deer-hunting season. As Brown described him, he was drinking beer,
reading a pornographic magazine, and wearing an NRA cap. Despite all
these noted differences from Brown, he did respond to her plea for help
and spent a couple of hours working to get her car started. Thus, they were
comrades for a short period of time, despite the differences.
Brown tells us that when she first read Levinson's essay on the Second
Amendment, this incident came back to her. She tried to imagine herself
72. See, e.g., West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 13; see also
Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand (1990) (national bestseller written by a
linguistics professor about the difficulty of male-female conversations across gendered life
experiences).
73. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 (1989).
74. Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On
Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale. LJ. 661 (1989).
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and the deerhunter sharing a commitment to republican virtue and joining
in the resistance of illegitimate state authority. Then she says, "I remember
something that gives me pause .... It occurred to me then, and now, that
if I had run into him in those woods without my friends or a common
project for us to work on, I would have been seized with one great and
appropriate fear: rape. '75
I read this and said to myself, "How true." Her fear and my fear raise
a point about the right to bear arms in a society in which males are sexually
violent to women. I hate guns, and the only time I think of bearing one is
to protect myself against male violence. But in fact, they have the guns, not
I; I do not think of guns as something men and women share in resisting
illegitimate authority.
The overwhelming reaction of my male colleagues, however, was
different. Apparently, the faculty lounge discussion of Brown's article went
something like this: "How dare she malign men like that? She is unfairly
stereotyping us all as potential rapists."
I missed the initial round of conversation on this point. It was reported
to me by those of my colleagues who sought the feminist view of the matter.
I only could respond that I had not viewed the young man in the story as
a real person whom she was maligning. Instead, I saw him as a metaphor
for male sexual violence. The men who help us also rape us. And, at some
very basic level, I did not understand the reaction of my -male colleagues. I
heard Wendy Brown say she would have feared rape had she met this
young man under different circumstances. My colleagues heard her accuse
them, along with the young man in the story, of being potential rapists.
One of my male colleagues has written a comment on Brown's
article. 76 The comment focuses on the danger of stereotyping, accusing
Brown of unfairly stereotyping the young man in her "remarkable
anecdote. '77 To stereotype all men as rapists, he claims, poses costs on the
innocent majority of men who are not rapists.78 His more serious concern
is that Brown is making unfair assumptions about this particular man solely
because he wears an NRA cap, hunts deer, drinks beer, drives a Winne-
bago, and enjoys reading pornography. I admit stereotyping all male
deerhunters is more problematic than stereotyping all males, but that is
beside the point. The point is that I can read one line in a feminist article
and identify with the author's fear of rape whereas my male colleagues read
the same line and hear the author accuse them of rape.79
75. Id. at 666.
76. Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 Const. Commentary 395
(1991).
77. Id. at 397.
78. Id. at 398.
79. The fear of rape is widespread among women. Some feminists report that at least one
out of every three females will be subjected to a violent sexual attack sometime in their lives.
See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 12, at 23; Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and
Gender 246 (1990); see also Allan Griswold Johnson, On the Prevalence of Rape in the United
States, 6 Signs 136, 145 (1980) (estimating that, measured from the age of 12, there is a
20-30% chance a girl will suffer a violent sexual attack sometime during her life); Diana E. H.
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The problem of gendered misunderstanding arises largely because
feminist jurisprudence reflects women's experience. When feminist legal
scholars write abstract legal theory in the "grand style,"8 0 there is much
room for misinterpretation by those who are strangers to women's experi-
ence. When feminist legal scholars do connected feminist scholarship-when
they reveal the experiences upon which their theory is based-there is less
room for misinterpretation. Nonetheless, a certain level of gendered
misunderstanding remains. For example, some feminist legal scholars
collect and analyze empirical data. Others write personal narratives or
borrow narratives from literature. Yet, as I suggested earlier, even this
"connected scholarship" is not fully understood by many of our male
colleagues. Often it is devalued as insufficiently theoretical or unrelated to
important legal issues.
The problem of gendered misunderstanding might be exacerbated by
the fact that we as feminist scholars spend so much time talking with each
other that we have begun to speak our own language. We may disagree
substantively. We may focus on different sorts of female experiences in our
theories. But we understand each other fairly well. In our conversations
with each other, some of them in law journals, this understanding enables
us to skip full descriptions of experience and move directly to theory. Thus,
when we feminists speak to each other, we lose other audiences. To reach
out to these lost audiences, I suggest that we consider devoting some time
to doing what I call "remedial feminist jurisprudence." My conception of
"remedial feministjurisprudence" is scholarship that explains its grounding
in women's experience in a way that can be heard by those who are
strangers to the experience. I do not mean "remedial" in a negative sense.8'
I mean to suggest a positive remedy that would help integrate the separate
conversations I see developing in our published scholarship.
The task I have in mind for feminist legal scholars is to translate the
experiences unearthed by feminist method into a communication that
conveys new knowledge to someone who is a stranger to those experiences.
It is the sort of task great filmmakers set for themselves. It is a call to
creativity. Some feminist scholars may object that to stop and explain our
Russell & Nancy Howell, The Prevalence of Rape in the Unitel States Revisited, 8 Signs 688,
695 (1983) (revisingJohnson's statistics to show a 46% probability that a woman will be a victim
of completed or attempted rape at some time in her life).
Given these statistics, it is not surprising that women fear rape. Laycock attaches an
appendix to his comment that reports rape statistics lower than those reported by feminist
legal scholars. Laycock, supra note 76, at 405. Nonetheless, Laycock is quick to express his
concurrence that Brown's fear of rape from an unknown man in the wilderness is reasonable.
Laycock and I do not disagree about the fact that women fear rape, nor that they are prudent
to do so. He and I identify with different actors in an anecdote. The result is that we interpret
the anecdote differently.
80. See Olsen, supra note 9, at 1147 (characterizing Catharine MacKinnon's work as grand
style feminist theory).
81. "Remedial" calls to mind a superior teacher working with an inferior student to
overcome a deficiency in the student. The student is slow to learn. The teacher must be
patient.
[1991]
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project will distract us from the central quest of building better theory.8 2
However, I think it is worth taking the time to attempt such explanations.
We should engage in two types of feminist scholarship: (1) Scholarship that
is addressed to each other-the exciting, yet often tentative, discoveries and
thoughts that engage us in debate; and (2) scholarship aimed at capturing
the attention and gaining the understanding of those who do not see the
world as we see it-scholarship intended to help others see the world
through our eyes, at least momentarily.
I may be wrong about the value of this latter task. I may be wrong
about the possibilities for success in this endeavor. I may be wrong because
of the nature of the misunderstanding. A feminist professor of philosophy,
Susan Sherwin, says:
It may just be that there is no way to do genuinely feminist
research and have it thoroughly respected by one's nonfeminist
colleagues. Feminism, after all, is ultimately extremely radical,
challenging the status quo in thought as well as in practice.
Feminist philosophy does not just offer new truths, or new
perspectives on truth .... I believe that feminism demands a
distinct way of doing philosophy and challenges the very practice
most philosophers pride themselves on having mastered.82
Professor Sherwin's observations about feminism and philosophy may be
equally true regarding feminism and law.84 In other words, the problem
may not be one of gendered misunderstanding, but rather one of fear and
self-protection.8 5 I hope this is not the case. I am sure it is not the case for
all of our male colleagues. At any rate, I look forward to the challenge of
doing more "connected" feminist scholarship. I hope my female colleagues
will join me. Similarly, I hope my male colleagues will listen and join the
conversation.
82. Some feminist scholars may claim that the explanations are already there. The
problem is that they have been ignored. To the extent this is true, I am calling for a recreation
and a regrounding.
83. Susan Sherwin, Philosophical Methodology and Feminist Methodology: Are They
Compatible?, in Women, Knowledge and Reality, supra note 39, at 24.
84. Consider the following story reported by Carl Tobias: A male faculty member opposes
a feminist faculty candidate because she "rejects both legal method and scholarship as
'male-dominated."' To hire her "would be a betrayal of our essence." Carl Tobias, 58 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 175, 178-79 (1989).
85. Fear is often expressed as anger. I have been in mixed (i.e., male and female) groups
that read feminist scholarship and I have been in mixed audiences that listened to feminist
speakers. Although Catharine MacKinnon seems to produce more anger in men than do other
feminists, she is certainly not alone in invoking that emotion. I can recall several MacKinnon
speeches at which women in the audience nod their head knowingly while men turn red in the
face. Her "abstract theory," which is founded on the notion that men (as a class) dominate
women (as a class) is heard by males in the audience as a personal attack on them-not unlike
my male colleagues' reaction to the Wendy Brown anecdote.
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